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ABSTRACT 
 
This article examines the mechanisms through which the Committee of Ministers ensures that 
the Council of Europe Member States comply with the decisions of the European Court of 
Human Rights.  It then offers new ideas as to how these mechanisms can be improved and 
evaluates the organisation’s attempt to deal with non-compliance problems through Protocol 
14.  It concludes that only by eliminating what has been termed the ‘legal/political gap’, will 
the organisation be truly effective in policing human rights abuses in Europe.  This should be 
done through a series of changes, namely a more dynamic approach by the Committee, 
greater involvement of the court in the implementation process and better cooperation with 
the European Union and the European Commissioner for Human Rights.  The organisation’s 
nature has changed from a group of self-policing States to largely a training centre for new 
democracies.  The Council needs to adapt quickly: unless its authority is firmly established in 
this new state of affairs, its ineffectiveness will encourage further non-compliance by the 
newer Member States. 
 
 
A INTRODUCTION 
 
The Council of Europe is the most renowned human rights organisation worldwide. 
Nonetheless, following its enlargement in the 1990s and its failure to adapt accordingly, its 
reputation and effectiveness in terms of judgment compliance are being compromised daily.  
The Council has traditionally relied on a combination of legal and political pressures for the 
implementation of judgments.  The legal mechanisms include the influence of the European 
Court of Human Rights
1
 in domestic legal systems and the fact that the European Convention 
on Human Rights has been nationally implemented by all Member States, while political 
mechanisms mostly rely on pressure from the Committee of Ministers and national 
organisations.  The court and the Committee function independently from each other, both 
formally and behind the scenes; however, implementation mechanisms can only achieve their 
true potential if the gap between the organisation‟s legal and political bodies is reduced as 
much as possible.  By drawing a clear dividing line between the legally binding judgments of 
the ECtHR and the political statements of the Committee, the system is downplaying the 
importance of the latter and harms the organisation‟s overall efficiency.  This article does not 
focus on the Committee or on the ECtHR in particular; its aim is to discuss the relationship 
between the two bodies and suggest ways in which their cooperation can be improved. 
The paper begins by examining the Council‟s characteristics which transformed it into 
a uniquely respected organisation and questions whether they remain helpful in the post-1990 
era.  It then proposes necessary reforms to avoid the organisation‟s decline: greater 
involvement of the ECtHR in the execution process and a more robust attitude against 
violators in the Committee.  Only by making the Council‟s bodies more aware of their 
common goals and their relationship to each other and to other international organisations, 
can the currently failing implementation mechanisms regain their effectiveness. 
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B THE WORKING MECHANISMS OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE 
 
Unlike most types of international treaties, human rights treaties are non-reciprocal: the State 
has no incentive to abide by the limitations on its sovereign power apart from good will since 
other Member States have no reason to force it to do so.
2
  Thus, most human rights bodies are 
unknown to the general public and their decisions are largely ignored by governments,
3
 a 
situation which can be contrasted with the European Union or the World Trade Organisation, 
organisations whose primary concern is the States‟ economies.  The exception to this is the 
Council of Europe: it consists of 47 Member States, yet it is compared to the German Federal 
and US Supreme Courts rather than other international bodies.  
 Despite the well accepted recognition of the Council‟s effectiveness, if its aim is truly 
to secure „the universal and effective recognition and observance of the Rights therein 
declared,‟4 the statistics show a less satisfactory picture.  The more „rapidly general measures 
are taken by States to execute judgments, the fewer repetitive applications there will be,‟5 yet 
60% of the court‟s judgments concern violations already condemned in the respondent State.6  
This is at a time when cases reaching the ECtHR have increased by 15% between 2006 and 
2007 and just 4 States generate half of the court‟s case load (Russia, Romania, Turkey and 
Ukraine).
7
  That is partly because of the individual complaints procedure, but it must also 
indicate that the Committee is in some ways failing its task. If the Council is to avoid the 
„ultimate asphyxiation of the system and a steady, painful loss of credibility,‟8 its working 
procedures must be reconsidered. 
The organisation‟s legal and political processes are largely distinct: on the legal level, 
the ECtHR decides whether a violation has taken place, and if it has, the case is sent to the 
political body of the Council, the Committee of Ministers, through which diplomatic pressure 
is exerted on the respondent State.
9
  The gap between these two procedures (what will be 
termed in this article as the „legal/political gap‟) determines the effectiveness of the 
organisation as a whole.  It affects each State to a different extent, since pressure for 
implementation works not only on a European, but on a national level as well.  However, the 
smaller the gap, the less likely a State is to take advantage of it and stray from its 
responsibilities.  It is suggested that the mechanism operating in the Committee ensures that a 
small individual improvement in compliance by many States cumulatively increases the 
overall pressure on those few non-compliant Parties.  However, bridging the gap by 
unilaterally increasing the powers of only one body is impossible in an organisation that 
works by unanimity.  Thus, all mechanisms need to be slightly modified, since the change has 
to be subtle enough for the States to agree to, but effective enough to make a difference in 
compliance.  The next four sections will discuss the existing mechanisms of the Council, the 
extent to which they are helpful today and how they can be improved.  The mechanisms are: 
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the ECtHR‟s credibility, the Committee‟s diplomatic pressure, the effect of the Council‟s 
relationship with the EU and the mechanism of indirect national pressure. 
 
 
1 The Legal Mechanism of the Council and the Credibility of the Court 
 
The first mechanism, the credibility of the ECtHR, is achieved through the court‟s transparent 
reasoning.
10
  The fact that almost every case has dissenting judgements shows that the 
proportionality test is not merely a tactic for the court to protect the applicant, but a tool 
which helps it reach the fairest result.
11
  This great success has led to a debate that is dividing 
the court: should it deliver individual or constitutional justice?  Those in favour of individual 
justice, mainly most NGOs, argue that the court‟s responsibility under the Convention is to 
provide redress for every violation.
12
  However, a court with 800 million potential applicants 
can never achieve this goal, making constitutional justice the only viable alternative.  
„Constitutional justice‟ has two different meanings: the first is that the court should interpret 
the Convention and by giving guidance to national courts act as the Supreme Court of 
Europe, what has been termed „Embeddedness‟.13  The second interpretation suggests that the 
ECtHR should deal with serious violation cases and not necessarily with those that have a 
general point to make.
14
  The problem with this suggestion is that the court will focus on 
article 2 and 3 violations at the expense of other articles and more compliant States.  
Secondly, it has become clear that the Committee does not have the teeth to implement gross 
and systematic violations.  Consequently, this interpretation will not only harm the 
organisation‟s reputation, but will arguably fail to deliver any justice.  Instead, by giving 
guidance to the national courts and shifting some responsibility to their shoulders through 
Embeddedness, national courts become active participants and are more likely to play by the 
ECtHR‟s rules.  This will have a positive effect not only in terms of implementation of 
decisions, but also in the coherence of the law.  Hefler argues that Embeddedness faces two 
problems: firstly, national Supreme Courts are willing to apply ECtHR‟s guidelines, this 
willingness is reduced in lower courts where most cases are dealt with.
15
  This can only be 
solved by educating lawyers and judges, not only on a European level, but most importantly 
domestically through the National Human Rights Institutions.
16
  The second problem is that 
in some countries, it is the courts themselves that are refusing to cooperate and are lacking 
impartiality.
17
  The solution to this is a more rigorous approach on the international level, a 
suggestion that will be elaborated in the second part of the paper.  Despite these difficulties, 
Embeddedness is a necessary development for better implementation of judgments.  
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2 The Political Mechanism of the Council and the Workings of the 
Committee of Ministers 
 
The Committee of Ministers is a forum where Member States‟ representatives (either the 
Foreign Minister or his Strasbourg based deputy) put pressure on the respondent State to 
remedy the violation and prevent further ones from taking place.  The Committee reviews 
each case every six months and issues interim resolutions on the State‟s progress, until the 
decision has been fully implemented and a final resolution is published.  Most States take this 
process seriously: for example, the Cypriot government employed Lord Lester of Herne Hill, 
QC to represent it in the Committee on the Turkish occupation issue, showing that it 
considers the Committee an effective medium through which it can present its case.
18
 
However, perhaps due to the different levels of democratic maturity in the 
organisation, the Committee has been inconsistent in what it will accept as an effective 
execution of a judgment.  Sometimes it is not satisfied with merely a draft proposal and waits 
for the enactment of the legislation and in others, bringing the judgment to the domestic 
authorities‟ attention is enough.19  Where an amendment in the legislation is unnecessary 
because national courts will prevent similar violations, the Committee requires proof through 
judicial practice.
20
  Again, the time period for which this is monitored varies.  
This flexibility, arguably an inherent characteristic of the political negotiation process, 
might have been acceptable when membership was restricted and expectations from States 
were more predictable, but this is no longer the case.  If deviation from ECtHR standards due 
to political exploitation of the Committee‟s processes is inevitable, more power should be 
transferred to other bodies of the organisation.  Therefore, a dilemma lies before the Council: 
the court can either expand its role to match its increasing significance in Europe, or it can 
restrain it, to match the capabilities of the Committee for the sake of a more internationally 
coherent organisation.  Solutions to this „legal/political gap‟ problem are discussed in section 
three. 
 
 
3 The Vague Relationship Between the Council of Europe and the European Union 
 
A number of the Council‟s most committed Members are also key players in the EU context, 
creating a relationship of cooperation and respect between the two organisations.  It is 
suggested that this could work to the Council‟s advantage by creating an added incentive for  
Member States to implement the ECtHR‟s decisions.  However, despite its potential, the EU-
Council relationship remains underdeveloped and hinders the organisation‟s well-
functioning.  Following the drafting of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and „the 
emergence of significant «conflicts of loyalties»‟21 the legitimacy of both systems is 
potentially compromised.  This was illustrated in Mathews v. UK
22
 which found the UK liable 
for violating the right to vote during the Euro-elections and forced it to decide between 
ignoring an ECtHR or a European Council decision. 
                                                 
18
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The vague relationship between the two organisations is also reflected in the language 
of the Copenhagen criteria,
23
 the EU accession criteria for new Member States.  They require 
that the applicant countries have stable institutions, are able to guarantee democracy, the rule 
of law, human rights, respect and protect minorities.  These undefined principles partly 
depend on ECtHR compliance, but it is unclear to what extent.
24
  Thus, Member States can 
use such vague requirements to keep candidate States out of the EU and protect their national 
interests, without harming their good international relations.  Following its accession 
application, Turkey made a number of domestic changes
25
 which were considered 
unsatisfactory by the EU.  Conversely, although some differences were noted in minorities‟ 
protection in Eastern Europe, the European Commission used virtually identical language to 
describe the situation in each country.
26
  Despite concerns over its poor human rights record, 
Slovakia joined the EU in 2004 while Turkey is waiting (arguably in vain) for an accession 
date.  Following the Commission‟s Report „The Europe Agreements and Beyond: a Strategy 
to Prepare the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe for Accession‟,27 the EU has 
politically and financially supported these States, while Turkey has only received criticism.  
This makes sense politically: Turkey‟s has a high birth rate and a population of 76 
million people
28
 making it the largest country in the EU, which translates into an influential 
minority in the Parliamentary Assembly.  Concurrently, the poor living conditions Turks live 
in, make countries such as Germany (with a Turkish population of 6 million people) worried 
of mass immigration as soon as Turkey receives full membership.
29
  These factors undeniably 
affect Turkey‟s accession prospects, but they cannot be openly admitted, turning human 
rights into a useful scapegoat.  When asked whether this is a problem, the ex-ECtHR Cypriot 
Judge Loukaides stated: „A violation is a violation.  The fact that the EU is using human 
rights as a tool for its political objectives does not change a simple fact.‟30  However, one 
should disagree
31
: this approach makes the Turkish population disillusioned with human 
rights as they are portrayed as hurdles to a better European life, undermining their 
significance and popularity.
32
  Unless the Council is to become another „intra-EU politics 
«toy»,‟33 it must keep up with the political realities in Europe and aim for a clearer 
relationship with the EU.  
 
 
4 The Indirect National Pressure for Compliance 
 
The fourth and most complex mechanism for compliance is indirect pressure in each State.  
This pressure arguably comes from the State‟s constitution, NHRIs, „elite opinion‟ and to a 
                                                 
23
 European Council in Copenhagen, Conclusions of the Presidency, 21-22 June 1993, (SN 180/1/93 REV 1). 
24
 H Arikan „A Lost Opportunity? A Critique of the EU‟s Human Rights Policy Towards Turkey‟ (2002) 7 
Mediterranean Politics 19, 22. 
25
 For example, it amended the penal code and did not ratify 200 death sentences. 
26
 Arikan (n 24) 32. 
27
 Commission (EC), „The Europe Agreements and Beyond: A Strategy to Prepare the Countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe for Accession‟ COM (94) 320 final, 13 July 1994. 
28
 Central Intelligence Agency „The World Factbook‟ <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/tu.html> (25 February 2010). 
29
 C Kassimeris and L Tsoumpanou „The Impact of the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms on Turkey‟s EU Candidacy‟ (2008) 12 International Journal of Human 
Rights 329 (Henceforth, „The impact of the ECHR on Turkey‟s EU candidacy‟). 
30
 Interview with ex- ECtHR Judge Loukaides, Nicosia (2 February 2009). 
31
 Kassimeris (n 29).  
32
 ibid. 
33
 S Stavrides „The Parliamentary Forum of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: An Assessment‟ (2002) 7 
Mediterranean Politics 30, 43. 
[2010] COLR 
 
 
lesser extent, general public opinion.  It is the interaction between these factors and their 
varying influence in each country that makes each State‟s record and attitude towards specific 
rights unique.  Ideally, these factors push for the implementation of ECtHR decisions on a 
national level, downplaying the inherent weakness of international pressure mechanisms and 
alleviating the non-reciprocity of human rights treaties.  However, because the newer, less 
compliant Member States lack one or more of the pressure mechanisms, a more 
internationally robust attitude, the subject matter of the next part of this paper, is necessary. 
Each State has incorporated the Convention in its own legal system and pressure to 
abide by national legislation is in most cases sufficient to ensure compliance.  Thus, the 
litmus paper for compliance is found in the controversial cases, which are usually not 
supported by the general public and have no direct political consequences.
34
  What is 
necessary to induce compliance in such cases therefore, is pressure from the „elite opinion‟, 
for example, academics and human rights organisations.  Generally, the mutual interlocking 
pressure from these internal factors can influence compliance.  For example, if the UK 
Parliament decides to violate a human right, it has to pass a law expressly stating this.  This 
law would be lobbied against by „elite opinion‟ groups which would argue that this violates 
the Human Rights Act 1998, imposing political prices (such as the division of the governing 
party) that the government might be reluctant to pay.  Even if this fails, the courts can issue a 
declaration of incompatibility, sending the law back to Parliament.
35
  At this stage, „elite 
opinion‟ will become more forceful and general public opinion will be engaged since the 
Act‟s opponents might use the media to influence the political climate – few governments are 
willing to risk being labelled „anti-human rights‟.  NHRIs, whose main role is to educate the 
public about their human rights, will also participate in this process.  
It is therefore vital that some respect for human rights exists before the State joins the 
Council so that these internal mechanisms can play their role.  It is submitted that if human 
rights protection does not meet a minimum threshold nationally, European pressure, which is 
largely residual, remains ineffective.  The EU is uniquely important in this respect because 
despite its international position the doctrine of direct effect allows it to initiate change from 
within.  The fact that existing respect for human rights is lacking in a number of the newer 
Member States should have been anticipated by the Council.  When the new States were 
admitted in the organisation, the argument was that they would gain more as insiders rather 
than outsiders.
36
  However, when the Council was transformed from a „club of 
democracies‟37 into partly a „training centre‟38 for new Member States, it failed to act as an 
„adjudicator of transition‟39 and guide the new Members to meet the required standards.  
Additionally, the Council should have maintained some minimum standard in its accession 
requirements.  For example, Russian politicians did not keep their anti-human rights 
sentiments a secret and it is questionable whether they understood the obligations they 
undertook at the time.
40
  Recently, in Shamayev v Russia and Georgia
41
 the Russian 
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authorities refused to allow the applicants‟ representatives to contact their clients and 
cancelled the fact-finding mission organised by the Council.
42
  Problematically, the Council 
was not only prepared to turn a blind eye to violations before accession, but it maintains a 
similar attitude after it.  
Apart from dissimilar levels of political willingness to comply with judgments, 
Member States differ culturally and economically.  For example, Moldova might want to 
follow the court‟s decisions, but it lacks the resources to do so.  Simultaneously, Azerbaijan 
faces significant human rights problems, yet it sends very few cases to the court, because the 
majority of its citizens lack the education and its lawyers the expertise to take this step.  
Consequently, fewer people are aware of their human rights and less prepared to press for 
their implementation on the national level.  Greer outlines seven main reasons why States fail 
to meet their Convention obligations: „political problems, the daunting scale of reforms 
required, legislative procedures, budgetary issues, public opinions, conflicting EU obligations 
and bureaucratic inertia.‟43  Each country faces at different times all, some or none of these 
problems.  At the other end of the spectrum, Germany has a good compliance record but 
rarely uses the ECtHR as it usually protects civil liberties through its domestic system.
44
  
These ranging national attitudes suggest that it is illusionary to assume that a single tactic will 
successfully boost compliance rates or that we can universally rely on the national processes 
for implementation; the Committee‟s flexible mechanisms are therefore necessary for the 
well-functioning of the organisation.  Nevertheless, if such flexibility is allowed without 
more specific guidance from the court, the factors outlined by Greer will become a fertile 
ground for accommodating excuses from less compliant States. 
 
 
C SUGGESTIONS FOR MORE EFFICIENT WORKING PROCEDURES IN 
THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE 
 
The Council‟s working mechanisms might have been efficient in the 1990s, but following its 
expansion, they must be developed further to fill the growing gap between the legal and the 
political processes of the organisation.  Despite the increasing chances of Protocol 14‟s non-
ratification due to the Russian veto, it still merits consideration as it includes the Council‟s 
most recent proposals on this matter.  Nonetheless, Protocol 14 was only intended to be a 
short to medium term solution so new proposals would be necessary shortly following its 
unlikely ratification.  The following sections will examine the Protocol‟s solutions and any 
suggestions that could have been included but were not.  Most of the suggestions are of a 
general nature, but two of them (exclusion from the Council and better cooperation with the 
EU) will be examined in light of the State they aim to affect the most (Russia and Turkey 
respectively). 
 
 
1 A More Proactive Approach by the Council as a Whole 
 
Rather than dealing with the compliance issue independently, Protocol 14 was primarily 
concerned with the overburdening of the court; in this respect therefore, it is a lost 
opportunity.  A long overdue change that was not suggested is the translation of case law and 
                                                                                                                                                        
41
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interim resolutions in the official languages of the Member States.  Many decisions concern 
the administrative authorities rather than the legislature and not every State official can read 
English or French.  Decisions are binding on the respondent State, leaving the majority of 
Germans or Russians to be governed by a law which they do not understand.  Ironically, it is 
the translation of documents into many languages that will unify the Council of Europe.  If 
the judgment is available in the State‟s formal language, it is more easily considered as part 
of the national law and implemented due to rule of law pressures.  Finally, the Council should 
endorse the Group of Wise Persons‟ suggestion that translated material „should be distributed 
as widely as possible, particularly within public institutions such as courts, investigative 
bodies, prison administrations, and non-state entities such as bar associations and 
professional organisations.  Law faculties should also figure among the most important 
recipients of these publications.‟45  These bodies possess what has been previously called 
„elite opinion‟; translating judgements makes it more likely that indirect national pressure 
will push for their execution. 
Translation becomes increasingly important if States are granted an erga omnes right, 
one of Greer‟s suggestions for improved compliance rates.46  An erga omnes right can be 
litigated by every country and not only by the victim.  It is thus possible, that one day 
Norway could bring a claim against Turkey for failing to meet its obligations, sending the 
message that systematic violators will not be tolerated.  Despite the tremendous advantages of 
this right, it is unlikely that it will ever be used since Norway has no interest in ruining its 
relations with Turkey, wasting time and money without itself benefiting from it.  Greer 
himself explains that the underutilised inter-state procedure rests on a naive contradiction: 
„the belief that litigious animosity between States will promote greater unity and respect for 
shared values.‟47  Why is the erga omnes procedure any different?  Therefore, more realistic 
and effective suggestions are needed. 
 
 
2 A More Dynamic Approach by the Committee against Non-Compliant States 
 
Article 8 of the Statute of the Council of Europe makes possible the exclusion of a 
systematically non-compliant State from the Council.  This has never been used; it was 
contemplated only once during the seven-year Junta in Greece, but the Generals withdrew 
before the Council had taken any action.
48
  It has been threatened indirectly once, when the 
Committee stressed „the compulsory jurisdiction of the court and the binding nature of its 
judgments‟ and asked the States „to ensure, with all means available to the Organisation, 
Turkey‟s compliance with its obligations.‟49  This goes to the root of Kamminga‟s criticism 
that the „the more serious and widespread the violations, the less adequate has been the 
response.‟50  States are much less likely to remedy systematic and gross violations because 
they know that the threat of exclusion, aiming to prevent exactly these, will never be used.  
The example that will be used in this discussion is Russia, a uniquely problematic State, not 
only because of its numerous violations, but mainly because of its consistent lack of political 
willingness to improve.  Thus, such aggressive use of the Council‟s powers should only be 
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made where national pressure mechanisms are completely ineffective, rendering other forms 
of pressure in the Committee futile. 
Harmsen argues that the Committee „will have to hold States strictly to account for 
their implementation of court decisions – taking such actions as are necessary, up to and 
including suspension from the Council itself.‟51  Before contemplating whether this is 
advantageous, the Council should clarify that membership is not something that States of an 
(albeit low) democratic status can take for granted; it is a privilege they must keep earning.  
Today, Eastern European States with little experience in human rights protection, the rule of 
law and democratic institutions have no incentive apart from their good will to comply with 
the court‟s decisions.52  The fact that they form a significant part of the organisation makes 
the Committee‟s pressure even less significant.  Had the Council demanded substantial 
improvements before their accession, the Committee‟s task would have been much simpler.  
Notably, a number of these States have recently joined the EU, emphasising that a closer 
relationship with the EU, including clarification of the Copenhagen criteria, would have been 
to the Council‟s advantage.  As things stand however, the only remaining tool in the 
Committee‟s hands is the threat of exclusion.  
The strongest argument against exclusion is that some protection is better than no 
protection, which will be the outcome if a State is excluded from the Council.
53
  
Problematically, only one country will be penalised for its actions, as others (equally 
deserving the same fate) will swiftly comply in order to avoid the punishment.  This country 
will also be the one with the most violations and in the greatest need for the Council‟s 
guidance.  Nevertheless, some countries are compromising the Council‟s reputation and using 
its money and time with no visible improvement.  For example, Mr Putin has suggested that 
Russia‟s non-ratification of Protocol 14 is a reaction to the judgment in Ilaşcu and Others v. 
Moldova and Russia.
54
  With attitudes dangerously resembling blackmail, one wonders what 
the Committee will accept before considering exclusion.  The court in Ilaşcu had asked for 
the prisoner‟s immediate release, but five years and four interim resolutions later, this has still 
not happened.  As Mark Janis predicted, „the same political importance of Russia that has 
prompted the Council of Europe to accept its admittance, will make it especially difficult for 
Strasburg to force the Russian Government to comply with adverse findings.‟55  Arguably, 
only Russia has this sort of power.  However, more than 50% of the courts‟ decisions 
ordering compensation are not executed at all or not within a reasonable period.
56
  This is 
partly due to a lack of political willingness to comply, and not only Russia‟s.  Slovenia, 
Georgia and Moldova had in 2008 the most violations per person,
57
 becoming Russia‟s 
potential allies in defying the court.  
A further issue is whether the article‟s use should be discretionary or whether it 
should depend on a predefined test, considering that its discretionary use so far has failed to 
convince of its success.  Understandably, no country is willing to step up first and ask that a 
violator is excluded.  If article 8 kicked in automatically and the Committee merely had to 
decide whether to execute its power, its use would not be so unlikely.  Thus, an accurate test 
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with time limits and number of violations is necessary to make the threat of exclusion a real 
one.  This suggestion however, raises more questions than it answers: will exclusion follow 
automatically if the test is satisfied or will some discretion be left to the Committee?  Will the 
test catch countries with serious violations, numerous violations or both?  Italy faces 
enormous article 6 problems, but it should not receive the same penalty as a systematic 
violator of articles 2 and 3.  On the other hand, a systematic violator of article 10 is 
intentionally downplaying the Council‟s biggest tool, national pressure, and should be 
punished.  Finally, as the Russian veto on Protocol 14 suggests, an amendment to article 8 
will be politically next to impossible.  Despite article 8‟s appeal in increasing the 
Committee‟s power, albeit due to lack of a better alternative, a number of loose strings must 
be brought together before it becomes an effective tool. 
 
 
3 Suggestions for More Involvement of the Court 
 
A third suggestion for the minimisation of the legal/political gap is expanding the court‟s 
functions and actively involving it in the implementation procedure, thus supplementing the 
Committee‟s work.  If the court is to preserve its role as Europe‟s human rights guarantor, „it 
will have to demonstrate a more acute awareness of its connections to the wider institutional 
system [of] which it is part.‟58  Traditionally, the respondent State chooses „subject to 
supervision by the Committee of Ministers, the general and/or, if appropriate, individual 
measures to be adopted in its domestic legal order to put an end to the violation.‟59  Although 
this suggests that only the State can choose the most appropriate measure, it should not stop 
the ECtHR from providing non-binding suggestions.
60
  Since court judgments receive more 
publicity than Committee resolutions, such suggestions would put implementation measures 
in the spotlight and encourage national pressure.  The fact that this suggestion was not 
included in Protocol 14 was fortunately not perceived by the court as a sign towards a more 
reserved approach and in Panovits v. Cyprus
61
 it argued that the court should take measures 
to „facilitate the Committee of Ministers‟ task in discharging these functions.‟62  The court‟s 
thinly argued jurisprudence and the lack of suggestions to remedy the violation are significant 
factors leading to the political exploitation of the Committee‟s procedures, one of the factors 
identified in the previous section as contributing to the non-enforcement of decisions.  This 
problem is heightened in cases where it is unclear why a violation was found in the first 
place, such as in Chorherr v. Austria
63
 where the ECtHR did not give a reasoning at all; 
unsurprisingly, the whole decision is only 18 paragraphs long.  Finally, greater involvement 
is consistent with the court‟s attitude in increasingly recommending the reopening of 
domestic legal procedures and with the relatively precise criteria it has set in the calculation 
of just satisfaction. 
A reason for the obscurity of ECtHR‟s decisions is the margin of appreciation, which 
despite its frequent use, is applied inconsistently.  It has been used both to avoid expressing 
an opinion on a controversial issue and to extend the width of the exceptions under which the 
State can justify the violation.
64
  Consequently, a significant part of the case law is sent to the 
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Committee with little guidance, allowing for more negotiation and a more watered down 
outcome.  Admittedly, the margin is facilitating the organisation‟s effectiveness by giving 
States more autonomy in deciding how much international interference to accept in their legal 
systems.  However, it is the Committee and not the court that should take into account such 
political considerations, so as to avoid the risk of creating a two-tier structure through which 
the newer democracies might distance themselves from the Council‟s expected standards.  
The reasoning behind the ECtHR‟s refusal to offer specific guidelines is that it does 
not know the national situation to such an extent so as to make a suggestion to the 
legislature.
65
  This argument should not be taken lightly; the ECtHR is an international court 
providing guidance, but the main players are the States themselves.  However, these 
difficulties can be overcome by making the court‟s suggestions non-binding and by informing 
it of the State‟s situation through a well organised system of annual reports.  The court has 
overridden the subsidiarity principle before, when it started acting as a first instance court 
when this was done inadequately by the respondent State.  This was supported on the basis of 
necessity: had the ECtHR not taken this step, justice would not be delivered.  The court finds 
itself in a similar dilemma today; hopefully it will be as pioneering as the last time.  
Offering guidance to States (which is supported by the interpretation proceedings in 
Protocol 14), implies that the ECtHR should deliver more detailed judgments, something 
which is not necessarily incompatible with the court‟s role as Europe‟s Constitutional Court.  
If the ECtHR is to acquire constitutional status, it must deliver its judgments in more general 
terms
66
, but this should not stop it from providing specific guidelines to the respondent State 
after that.  This will make the judgments longer, but it will be beneficial in the long term 
since it will be easier for the Committee to monitor objectively whether the judgment has 
been complied with.  Additionally, the increasing guidance and responsibility given to 
national courts will result in fewer cases reaching the ECtHR, since most will be adequately 
dealt with domestically.
67
  This however, presupposes the independence of the judiciary and a 
developed rule of law, which begs the question once again: can States of such different values 
and democratic maturity form an efficient international organisation?  
Discussion of the court‟s contribution would be incomplete without mentioning the 
pilot judgments procedure.  This allows the court to find the violation only once, freeze cases 
with identical facts and send them back to be tried by national courts.
68
  Even though this is 
probably effective in saving the court‟s time, it is less so in terms of compliance.  
Theoretically, the procedure shows to the respondent State the systematic violation, so action 
is taken; however, in almost all of these cases the State is aware of the problem and merely 
ignores it.  The assumption is that the domestic system will deal with the violations, but 
unless there is political willingness and an independent judiciary, this cannot happen.  Pilot 
judgements do not solve cases, they merely hide them.  Finally, the procedure seems to be in 
contrast with another tactic of the court, namely giving priority to systemic violation cases.  It 
is still unclear from the court‟s jurisprudence how it decides between these two methods, 
potentially undermining the court‟s credibility.  Despite the persuasiveness of these 
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arguments the court has recently used the mechanism in Burdov v. Russia (No. 2).
69
  It 
remains to be seen whether pilot judgements will prove effective in the Russian context. 
 
4 The Micro Level: Cooperation Between the Constituent Bodies of the Council 
 
(a) The Infringement Proceedings 
 
The infringement proceedings, suggested in article 16(4) of Protocol 14, are to be used when 
the Committee wants to emphasise a State‟s consistent failure to meet its obligations and will 
be available following a formal notice issued by a two thirds majority.  The Committee will 
use this power discretionarily, increasing the risk of being accused by the respondent State as 
motivated by aims other than human rights protection and endangering the Council‟s 
reputation as an impartial organisation.  This is especially problematic with respect to Russia 
which has already made such allegations.  
Underlying this mechanism is an unfounded assumption that the sheer fear of the 
proceedings will encourage compliance.  However, if pressure from the Committee has failed 
so far, why should it succeed now?  What new factor motivates the State to act that did not 
exist before?  Additionally, the court cannot reopen the question of whether a violation has 
occurred; it will merely rule on whether the State has taken the required measures following 
its last judgment.  Consequently, either the court will find that the obligation has been 
discharged (contradicting the Committee‟s findings) or that it has not, sending the case back 
to the Committee.  Unless the Committee uses article 8, its only other alternative is to 
continue with diplomatic pressures as before.  Thus, apart from exceptional circumstances, 
the procedure will merely highlight the organisation‟s weaknesses as a whole rather than 
achieve anything substantial.  
The court itself has made its reservations towards the infringement proceedings clear, 
further undermining their potential effectiveness:  
 
What would be the procedural rights of the respondent State? What form 
would the decision finding a violation take? Who would represent the 
Committee of Ministers before the [c]ourt? What would be the basis for 
making a finding of violation? Would this not raise questions of 
interpretation of the initial judgment?
70
  
The problem is not that the procedure blurs the distinction between the legal and 
political organs of the organisation, but that it has not been thought through properly, leading 
to possible conflict rather than cooperation between them.  If and when the Council is given 
an opportunity to rethink the Protocol‟s successor, article 16(4) merits reconsideration. 
 
 
(b) The Interpretation Proceedings 
 
Another suggestion in Protocol 14 is the interpretation proceedings through which the 
Committee (again, with a two thirds majority) will send the case to the court for further 
clarification if it considers that the „execution of a final judgment is hindered by a problem of 
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interpretation‟.71  Since a factor for non-compliance (or more dangerously, only superficial 
compliance) is lack of clarity in the court‟s reasoning, the Committee will in time clarify the 
extent and type of guidance it expects from the ECtHR.
72
  The mechanism will encourage 
dialogue between the Committee and the court, thus limit the gap between the two bodies.  
Furthermore, the proceedings will be useful in universalising the interpretation of the 
Convention.  Concerns about added workload overburdening the court are exaggerated as the 
procedure will be confined to isolated cases where the court has not had an opportunity to 
clarify its case law through a subsequent judgment.
73
  The mechanism will also separate 
States which truly require further judicial guidance from those which are camouflaging their 
political unwillingness with difficulty to act due to lack of clarity in the decision.  The court 
should not wait for the ratification Protocol 14 to use the proceedings, as it has already 
recognised their validity and desirability: in Ringeisen v. Austria
74
 the question was whether 
the court could deliver a further judgement by way of interpretation.  Austria argued that this 
was impossible without a Convention amendment because under article 52 judgements are 
final.  The court unanimously rejected this since the object of the article was to exclude the 
possibility of appeals; interpretation of a judgment is not an appeal as it is delivered by the 
same court.  Admittedly, the Protocol mechanism is broader than the Ringeisen interpretation 
process because it gives the court the opportunity to interpret general points of law, not just 
specific judgments.  Nevertheless, the court‟s reasoning remains persuasive for the 
interpretation proceedings as well and could be expanded to operate as a remedy to one of the 
Council‟s classic problems.  
 
 
(c) The European Commissioner for Human Rights 
 
Another body which could play a more prominent role in the better implementation of 
judgments is the Commissioner for Human Rights.  The Commissioner‟s responsibilities 
include identifying possible shortcomings in national laws, facilitating the activities of 
NHRIs and providing advice and information regarding human rights protection across the 
region.
75
  Despite all these, it remains marginalised in the implementation procedure.  Under 
the Council umbrella, there are a number of bodies generally unknown to the public which 
have similar functions between themselves, resulting either in duplication of their work or 
conflicting proposals on the same issues.
76
  These bodies individually ask for annual 
governmental reports, making the task look like a bureaucratic obligation rather than a useful 
exercise of self-criticism.  The integration of the work of these bodies through the 
Commissioner‟s office could be to the advantage of both the States and the Council.  
The States would deal with a single, influential body and send only one annual report, 
enabling the Commissioner to monitor and evaluate their progress as a whole and 
encouraging the States themselves to take their reporting obligation more seriously.  The 
Commissioner should lay down specific requirements, including the avoidance of media 
reports and academic opinions in reporting as they give the government considerable scope to 
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only include favourable comments.
77
  Furthermore, reporting would be taken more seriously 
if the Commissioner had the power to carry out organised and ad hoc investigations to ensure 
that the reports were accurate, a power that could not be granted to the numerous Committees 
since that would be an unacceptable infringement of state sovereignty.  The gathering of 
reports would enable the Commissioner to act as an easy access point to information, an 
integrated library for the States and the Council.  The Commissioner could give the ECtHR a 
more detailed understanding of each country‟s problems and legitimise judgments containing 
general solutions for systematic violations.  Its position as the Council‟s Library would also 
make it unnecessary for the ECtHR to act as a first instance court, thus saving the court even 
more time and further protecting its credibility since the information before it will have been 
provided by an independent body.  Furthermore, the reports would help the court identify 
systematic violations more easily and would be a useful tool for the Council to determine 
whether the suggestions outlined above are indeed effective.  Finally, the Commissioner‟s 
library should also include information on the national reforms for better enforcement of 
decisions.  Ukraine and Italy have recently made such reforms
78
; the next State to do this 
could have access to them and might avoid having to reinvent the wheel.  
The integration would make the Committees more aware of the workings of other 
bodies and their conclusions would acquire added weight due to the support of a more 
influential body.  However, this suggestion brings with it the danger of a „one size fits all‟ 
approach which could ignore less traditional rights, such as social rights, and will be 
vigorously opposed by the relevant Committees.
79
  Therefore, they should be given a strong 
say in what questions are being asked and if the information provided is inadequate, States 
should be made aware of this.  Notably, a number of social rights and equality issues are 
addressed in the EU context as well, making the case for closer cooperation between the two 
organisations even stronger, and the need for an integrated body within the Council more 
necessary.  
The Parliamentary Assembly‟s suggestion to allow the Commissioner to lodge 
complaints to the ECtHR
80
 was rejected due to fears of increasing the court‟s workload; 
however, the process would arguably have had the opposite result as similar cases would be 
brought together in group actions.  The Commissioner could focus on cases which are 
unlikely to be brought to justice by the victims themselves, carrying out the bulk of his work 
in the newer democracies where people are generally poorer and more reluctant to take action 
to secure their rights.
81
  This will be an important part of a coordinated approach by the 
Council to bring newer democracies up to the standard expected by the organisation.  
Furthermore, national reforms on a more general scale (for example, legislative amendments) 
will only need to be made once, as one case will deal with different issues of the same 
violation.  It is more likely that Parliaments will remedy a grave violation rather than many 
less serious ones, partly because national pressure will be motivated more easily for a big 
change than a small one.  
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Leach persuasively argues that concerns that the Commissioner‟s power to bring 
claims will compromise its advisory role behind the scenes are unfounded.
82
  In fact, if the 
power is used selectively, it might enhance the Commissioner‟s position as it will strengthen 
his soft law functions.  Finally, giving standing to the Commissioner will alleviate the 
shortcomings of the erga omnes approach which has a similar purpose, but which no State is 
likely to use due to political considerations.  The Commissioner‟s more prominent role 
bridges the gap between the organisation‟s legal and political procedures as the integrated 
reporting process provides tools and information to the Committee to adopt a more robust 
attitude against violators.  Simultaneously, it strengthens existing mechanisms such as the 
ECtHR‟s credibility and integrated national pressure and provides a medium through which 
the relationship between the Council and the EU can develop further.  
 
 
4 The Macro-Level: The Council’s International Relationships – Better 
Cooperation with the European Union 
 
Today, neither the EU nor the Council can go forward with accession, but such a step would 
be beneficial to both parties.  If the EU is to justify its move towards a European 
„citizenship‟,83 genuine human rights protection is a necessary ingredient.  Also, accession 
will show to Member States that the EU can adequately protect human rights, thus avoiding 
another constitutional rebellion like the one led by Germany in the 1990s.
84
  Finally, the EU 
will acquire the right to defend itself in proceedings rather than having to rely on one of its 
Member States.
85
  Simultaneously, the Council will formally become the supreme human 
rights body in Europe, overriding conflicting interpretations of the EU Charter on 
Fundamental Rights and reinforcing the need to transform the ECtHR into a constitutional 
court.  Judge Loukaides suggested
86
 that the significance of accession will largely be 
theoretical because only in very rare cases will the ECtHR review the actions of EU 
institutions.  In fact, the ECJ will have to make fundamental changes to its interpretation of 
article 230(4) (individual petition to the ECJ) if it wants to avoid article 6 violations.  An 
improved individual petition procedure will impact on the ECJ‟s jurisprudence and could 
enhance cooperation between EU States, resulting in stronger alliances and more robust 
attitudes in the Committee.  
The common arena in which the two organisations work, which calls for greater 
cooperation between them, is illustrated through the case of Apostolides v. Orams.
87
  The 
issue was whether Apostolides, a Greek Cypriot owning a house in the occupied area, could 
demand from the Orams, who had illegally acquired its title from a Turkish Cypriot, to vacate 
the house and pay damages.  He obtained a ruling from a Cypriot court
88
 that this was 
possible and sought to enforce it in the UK under Regulation No 44/2001 which ensures the 
free movement of judgments.  The Court of Appeal asked the ECJ whether such a ruling was 
enforceable in the UK, despite the Cypriot government‟s non-effective control in the 
occupied area.  The court ruled that the judgment was enforceable, making the ECJ a relevant 
court in the Turkish/Cypriot issue, even though Turkey is not an EU Member State.  
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Although the ECtHR had recently held that the compensation regime introduced by the 
„Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus‟ is in principle sufficient to meet the damage claims89  
and despite the fact that Apostolides had not applied to the Commission, damages were 
payable.  Following this decision, Greek Cypriots whose property has been sold to EU 
citizens have a (more effective and quicker) alternative remedy to the ECtHR.  Notably, had 
an ECtHR judgment on this specific property claim existed, he would not have had recourse 
to the ECJ, putting at a disadvantage those who sought redress through the Council.  Finally, 
Advocate General Kokott discussed whether her judgment would „undermine the efforts of 
the international community to find a solution to the Cyprus problem,‟90 a matter which 
should have arguably been dealt with by a political body, such as the Committee of Ministers.  
The judgment might confer individual justice to Mr Apostolides, but it also emphasises that 
the vague relationship between the two organisations is not to the Council‟s advantage.  
Despite Protocol 14 making provisions about EU accession in the Council,
91
 it does 
not include any other steps to clarify the relationship between the two organisations.  Such 
clarification would put pressure on existing and aspiring Members States, most significantly 
Turkey.  States such as Russia will remain largely unaffected, but the underlying theory 
behind most of the suggestions in this paper is that a specific approach to smaller groups of 
countries is more effective than a general tactic for all States.  It has already been argued that 
the Copenhagen criteria are vague and easily manipulated.  The Council and the EU could 
form a Joint Committee which could assess each EU Applicant State‟s improvement, bearing 
in mind its national situation and resources.  The Joint Committee should work with clear 
criteria, untainted by political considerations as much as possible.  Its suggestions could 
indicate to the EU whether the State can become a Member and to the Council whether the 
execution procedure is working effectively.  Although these indications should not be 
binding, they could justify and legitimise decisions of both organisations. 
Nevertheless, the argument that the vagueness of the criteria is deliberate and 
preferable to the alternative has its merits.  No one can predict what will happen if Turkey is 
told that it can never join the EU, but its efforts for human rights protection could 
immediately stop.  On the other hand, if it is given a definite date, it might lose its incentive 
for improvement.  However, for how long will human rights language be used as the EU‟s 
scapegoat, compromising the Council‟s efforts?  Arguably, if Turkey was to join the EU in its 
current state, it would have to be excluded from the organisation the next day since it would 
fall below the EU‟s internal human rights standards.  Turkey might be unique in this respect 
today, but this will not be the case for long.  Numerous applications from Bosnians being 
discriminated against by Eastern European States are going through the ECtHR at the 
moment.  In five to seven years, the human rights records of these States will resemble 
Turkey‟s current record, but unlike Turkey they will be full Members of the EU.  If the EU is 
genuinely interested in protecting human rights, it will have to react to this – either through 
exclusion or strong public criticism of their record.  Had the Copenhagen criteria been 
properly followed, both organisations would have avoided this situation. 
Judge Loukaides
92
 suggested that a mechanism should exist whereby if a Member 
State falls below ECtHR standards, it should automatically be excluded from both 
organisations, creating a direct link between the EU and the Council and encouraging States 
to work towards improving their human rights record even after they join the Council.  
Penalties will range from a simple interim report to non-participation in the Committee and 
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finally exclusion from the organisations.  However, this seems not only an unattainable but 
also an undesirable suggestion.  The two organisations are distinct and separate and should 
remain as such, especially for such deeply political and controversial decisions.  For example, 
the EU cannot be expected to exclude Italy, due to article 6 violations, especially since Italy 
also has a poor EU Directive enforcement record, yet this has never led to suggestions for its 
exclusion from the EU.  Clearly, part of the solution for ECtHR compliance is making the EU 
adopt a more robust stand towards human rights violations.  However, this can be achieved 
through subtler means instead of a direct (and unequal) relationship of dependence between 
the organisations.  For example, at the moment, the Fundamental Rights Agency produces a 
report of violations from Members States, yet this report has not received considerable 
attention by the media.  Instead, the report could be published by the European Commission, 
generating enough publicity to motivate States into action, through the usual national 
pressure mechanisms.  
 
 
D CONCLUSION 
 
The Council is the most effective human rights organisation worldwide; this does not 
necessarily mean that it is good enough.  Its failure to notice that in the last decade its 
jurisdiction has expanded considerably, has led to inadequate steps for reform.  The 
Explanatory Report‟s conclusion that supervision generally works well93 is not based on any 
empirical data.  In fact, in 2003, 520 new cases were sent to the ECtHR and 3540 decisions 
were pending consideration in the Committee; in 2007, the numbers went up to 718 and 6017 
respectively.
94
  Since „the acid test of any judicial system is how promptly and effectively 
judgments are implemented,‟95 effectiveness should not be determined by how many cases 
are being tried every year, but how many of these result in the stopping of a violation.  
Responsibility for this rests with the Committee, yet it receives minimal attention compared 
to the ECtHR.  We must stop paying lip service to the effectiveness of the court and look at 
the organisation as a whole. 
Over the years, the Council‟s judicial branch has developed to such an extent that it 
can only be compared with the ECJ and national supreme courts.  Yet, its political branch 
remains largely underdeveloped, failing to keep up with the responsibility the court‟s success 
has imposed on it.  The inconsistency in these two branches‟ development, what has been 
termed „the legal/political gap‟, has grave consequences for the organisation‟s future.  As a 
matter of political reality however, the workings of the Committee cannot change 
considerably and arguably this is for the better.  Ultimately, international law, especially 
human rights, comes down to politics and diplomacy and the Committee should remain the 
forum where these come into play.  However, although the Committee is the protagonist in 
the implementation procedure, it cannot lift the entire burden on its own.  If a more robust 
approach is impossible, then some of the responsibilities which traditionally fell within its 
ambit should be allocated to other Council bodies.  A more coordinated approach, both within 
the Council and internationally can adequately overcome the Committee‟s limitations while 
maintaining its advantages.  
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History has shown that either international organisations become stronger and acquire 
their position in the world scene or they become victims of their stronger Members‟ whim.  
Fifty years after its creation, the Council is at its crossroads: unless it takes a step forward 
soon, events will supersede it and it will inevitably be left a step back.  Arguably a change in 
a single working mechanism will be politically impossible to agree to and ineffective due to 
the range of different problems it will have to address.  A more in depth understanding of the 
incompliance of Member States, shows that systematic violators have diverse reasons for 
their attitudes, which require different solutions.  Only by adopting this seemingly 
fragmented approach can vastly different States be effectively united under a single 
organisation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
